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INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution guarantees all defendants
access to a fair and impartial criminal justice system. 1 To
ensure that non-English speaking defendants have access to
this fair and impartial criminal justice system, language access
and effective assistance is imperative. From becoming familiar
with how to file a claim, to the importance of accurate and
adequate communications between client and attorney, the
scope for constitutional concern is plethoric. The Sixth
Amendment, for example, entitles defendants to, amongst
other things, effective assistance of counsel for his or her
defense. 2 How can counsel be effective if he or she does not
speak the same language as his or her client? Is it possible to
establish a consistent method of legal access for foreign
language petitioners in habeas corpus cases?
In order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, counsel and client must be able to
effectively communicate with each other. 3 For counsel and
client to be able to communicate in circumstances where the
client speaks a foreign language, counsel bears a greater
burden of ensuring that communication is effective and that
the client is confident that he or she understands and is
understood. 4 This, in effect, ensures that counsel adheres to
effective assistance as required by the Sixth Amendment.
There is no clear or consistent authority on foreign
language access issues in the context of ineffective assistance
of counsel. As a result, future litigants have little guidance in
terms of how best to approach other foreign language issues
going forward. These issues are herein illustrated primarily
by the habeas cases of Mendoza v. Carey, 5 Yang v. Archuleta, 6
and United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones. 7 Ultimately, whilst
some procedural safeguards have been implemented to protect
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3
See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012); see also ABA/SCLAID
Providing Services to Language Minority Clients, Equal Justice Conference
2006, NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, at 14 (2006).
4
Id.
5
Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).
6
Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2008).
7
United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones, No. 07 C 6099, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121919 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2008).
1
2
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language minorities in the courtroom, such as specific training
and selection of interpreters at the federal level, 8 these
safeguards are not enough and certainly do not cure lost-intranslation attorney-client communications more generally.
This article starts by articulating the test under
Strickland v. Washington, before turning to language access
habeas cases and language interpretation to demonstrate the
inadequate state of language access in the legal system. The
article concludes by reiterating the importance of safeguards
for clients who speak foreign languages inside and outside the
courtroom and provides some recommendations to assist in
implementing necessary safeguards.
I. TEST UNDER STRICKLAND
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington established a two-prong test to govern ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. 9 For a defendant to obtain
reversal of a conviction or to vacate a sentence based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show that: (1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unreasonable performance, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. 10 This second prong is
the prejudice standard. 11
The Supreme Court has also held that the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to
pre-trial proceedings. 12 “It guarantees a defendant the right to
have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal
proceedings.” 13 The Court has expressly stated that critical
stages include “the entry of a guilty plea.” 14 The Sixth
Amendment right must extend beyond pre-trial proceedings to
also include access to said proceedings. How can effective
assistance be adhered to only during legal proceedings and not
encapsulate the very first attorney-client encounter? It is
submitted that the right is violated if effective assistance is not
8
Appointment of interpreters for non-English speakers, as well as specific
training and selection, is mandated under 28 U.S. Code § 1827.
9
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012).
13
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28.
14
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31, 34 (1972).
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adhered to from entry to exit in the context of the criminal
justice system. Effective assistance must be on a continuum of
an immigrant’s experience with the criminal justice system—
not just during legal proceedings. One obvious example of
where such assistance must be recognized is in relation to
habeas claims.
II. HABEAS CORPUS CLAIMS FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE
SPEAKING PETITIONERS
Habeas claims, made via writ of habeas corpus, provide a
crucial last-ditch attempt for litigants to obtain relief in the
criminal justice system. They are federal claims often
challenging unconstitutional incarceration, alleged in
circumstances where all remedies in state court have been
exhausted. 15 The stakes, therefore, are high for habeas
petitioners. Relatively recent case law only illustrates the tip
of the iceberg concerning problems associated with foreign
language access to habeas claims and access to the justice
system more broadly. 16 The trend has been that most courts
have denied the right to access legal materials generally, as
well as specifically denying access to legal materials in a
foreign language. 17 These circumstances can be seen in the
context of equitable tolling. The case of Mendoza v. Carey, has
been the most discussed case on this issue, namely because it
“[came] out of left field,” 18 distinguished itself from the steady
accord of case law denying access to legal materials, and gave
new hope to foreign language habeas petitioners. 19
This section provides a high-level chronology of case law
in the context of equitable tolling. It highlights that the Ninth
Circuit currently stands alone in protecting access to habeas
through its interpretation of extraordinary circumstance as an
equitable tolling requirement. It more broadly stresses the
need for case-by-case application in circumstances where a
non-English speaker seeks access to legal materials and to the
legal system.
15
See Megan Grandinetti, Ensuring Access to Justice for Non-English-Speaking
Criminal Defendants: Denial of Access to Other-Language Legal Materials or
Assistance As an Extraordinary Circumstance for Equitable Tolling, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2008).
16
See Mendoza, supra note 5; Yang, supra note 6; Sanchez, supra note 7.
17
Jay W. Spencer, Habeas Corpus Law in the Ninth Circuit After Mendoza v.
Carey: A New Era?, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (2008).
18
Id.
19
Id.
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A. The facts and findings in Mendoza
In 2006, petitioner Mendoza filed a writ of habeas corpus
claiming that lack of access to Spanish-language legal
materials prevented him from learning about filing deadlines
under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(1996) (AEDPA) and therefore prevented his timely filing. 20
The elements Mendoza was required to establish to satisfy
equitable tolling were that: (1) he had been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in
his way. 21 As to the first element, Mendoza claimed that he
requested Spanish-language legal material when he was first
incarcerated but was told “to wait until he got to his regular
assigned prison.” 22 Once he had arrived at his regular assigned
prison, Mendoza claimed to have made several trips to the
library but found only English-language materials and
English-speaking librarians. 23 Mendoza eventually found a
newly-arrived, bilingual inmate who was willing to offer
assistance to Mendoza in filing his habeas petition. 24 As to the
second element, Mendoza alleged that the prison’s law library’s
lack of Spanish-language materials and his inability to obtain
translation assistance before the requisite time deadline
constituted extraordinary circumstances. 25 The Ninth Circuit
Court agreed and remanded the matter for appropriate
development on the record. 26
The Court was, however, quick to reinforce the principle
that equitable tolling may be justified if language barriers
“actually prevent timely filing” but that a petitioner’s language
limitations generally do not justify equitable tolling. 27 In Kane
v. Espitia the Supreme Court held that a petitioner in jail
awaiting trial did not have a clearly established right under
federal law to access a law library as required for federal
habeas relief. 28 The Mendoza Court expressly narrowed its
decision to cases involving equitable tolling, rather than the
actual grant of habeas relief for a constitutional violation. 29
Mendoza, supra note 5, at 1067.
Id. at 1068.
22
Id. at 1067.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1069.
25
Id.
26
Mendoza, 449 F.3d, at 1071.
27
Id. at 1069-70.
28
Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005).
29
Mendoza, supra note 5, at 1070-71.
20
21
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This, in effect, allowed the Court to sidestep the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kane and grant relief in this instance.
Conversely, in Yang v. Archuleta the court did not grant relief,
and in doing so, reverted the issue of language access back to
a strict approach, whereby no right of access to legal material
nor foreign language-material was recognized. 30
B. The facts and findings in Yang
In April 2008, based on similar facts, the Tenth Circuit
Court in Yang31 declined to follow Mendoza. 32 Yang filed a
habeas writ and the district court ordered him to show cause
as to why his petition should not be denied because it was not
filed within the one-year limitation period under AEDPA. 33
Amongst other things, Yang urged equitable tolling due to his
lack of English-language proficiency. 34 The district court
rejected the argument, stating that it did not consider
“difficulty with the English-language sufficient to warrant
equitable tolling.” 35
The Court held that Yang did not allege with specificity
“the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal claims” 36 and
that he did not “set forth what actions he pursued to secure
assistance with his language barrier inside or outside prison
boundaries.” 37 Yang had also alleged that his attorney for the
state court appeal did not inform him of the filing deadline and
he was not able to find an inmate to help him in time. 38 The
court held that Yang’s “conclusory statement”—that he
“diligently pursued his rights and remedies”—did not suffice. 39
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones, No. 07 C
6099, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121919 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2008),
petitioner Sanchez did not frame his claims with the specificity
required for equitable tolling relief, so the court rejected
petitioner’s argument. 40 The Sanchez decision is yet another
recent example of the pushback from Mendoza at all levels of
Yang, supra note 6, at 929-30.
Id. at 927.
32
Id. at 929.
33
Id. at 927.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Yang, 525 F.3d at 930.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 928-29.
39
Id.
40
Sanchez, supra note 7, at 7-8.
30
31
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the judicial system.
C. The facts and findings in Sanchez
In July 2008, the Northern District Court of Illinois in
United States ex rel. Sanchez v. Jones 41 followed in Yang’s
footsteps and rejected Mendoza. 42 The District Court in
Sanchez was, however, bound by the decision in Montenegro v.
United States. 43 “In Montenegro, the Seventh Circuit held that
a pro se prisoner who could ‘speak little English’ and filed an
untimely habeas petition was not entitled to equitable tolling
due to the language barrier, his attorney’s failure to respond to
his letters, the prisoner’s lack of legal knowledge, and delays
caused by a transfer between prisons.” 44 On this basis, the
court rejected Sanchez’s claim. 45
Petitioner Sanchez alleged that he did not understand the
tolling rules and that his state court counsel did not explain
the relevant rules to him. 46 Sanchez also contended that
Spanish was his first language and that he needed to have
legal matters communicated in Spanish to understand them
fully. 47 In response to the first claim, the court stated that
Sanchez did not claim unawareness of the filing deadline, or
that he was unable to secure translation assistance “despite
timely and diligent efforts to do so.” 48 The court therefore
viewed Sanchez’s claim as a general language barrier claim,49
and held that it was insufficient to support equitable tolling. 50
In response to the second claim, the court stated that Sanchez
“never intimated that he was unable to obtain any translation
assistance despite diligent, consistent efforts to do so before the
limitations period expired.” 51 The court acknowledged the
“slightly more lenient approach” taken by the court in Mendoza
and Yang, though sharply discounted these cases as

Id. at 6-7.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 5.
45
Id. at 7-8.
46
Sanchez, supra note 7.
47
Id. at 2.
48
Id.
49
Id. “[Sanchez] simply contends that he is pro se, has a limited education and
limited literacy, and thus should be able to proceed despite his mistake.”
50
Id. at 4.
51
Id. at 7.
41
42
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inconsistent with Seventh Circuit authority. 52
D. Lessons learned from Mendoza, Yang and Sanchez
Has Mendoza set a new trend, or will the courts continue
to downplay its application in subsequent cases? In other
words, will foreign language speaking petitioners continue to
be denied access to legal materials in their own language? It
has been suggested that the court in Mendoza “demonstrated
a proper use of equitable tolling,” and that its approach to
ensuring equal access to habeas claims “properly reflects the
writ’s important role in protecting the rights of prisoners.” 53
The Mendoza decision sets a factual standard by which foreign
language prisoners can measure their claims against
considering whether to pursue litigation. It is submitted that
this standard requires conscientious scrutiny of the facts of
each case before applying the law in a way that is consistent
with upholding a petitioner’s Constitutional rights, including
the right to effective assistance of counsel. However, the cases
subsequent to Mendoza bring this standard into question and,
effectively put prisoners back at square one. It is true that
prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, 54 and broader application of Mendoza
may “place an increased burden on judicial resources.”55
However, the importance of factually distinguishing Englishlanguage-based habeas claims from foreign language-based
habeas claims must be addressed to ensure access not only to
the courts, but to effective assistance of counsel. Congruent
with other scholars’ views, Mendoza strikes a sound balance
between the protection of the right of equal access to the writ
of habeas corpus and prevention of overburdening judicial
resources 56 by adhering to a strict fact-based analysis.
Therefore, the factual inquiry and subsequent application in
Mendoza is reasonable and provides some necessary guidance.
III. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE ART OF
INTERPRETATION
What role does effective assistance of counsel play in the

Sanchez, supra note 7, at 6–7.
Spencer, supra note 17, at 1016.
54
Sanchez, supra note 7, at 3; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991).
55
Spencer, supra note 17, at 1016.
56
Id.
52
53
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need for interpreters? In order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment
right, it is imperative that counsel and client are able to
effectively communicate. 57 For counsel and client to be able to
communicate in circumstances where the client speaks a
foreign language, it is axiomatic that counsel bears a greater
burden of ensuring that communication is effective and that
the client is confident that he or she understands and is
understood. 58 This, in effect, ensures that counsel adheres to
effective assistance as required by the Sixth Amendment.
This section highlights the importance of access to
adequate interpretation at all stages of the legal system, not
just upon reaching court. The fact that interpretation services
are only guaranteed in court is a gross denial of fundamental
rights and often results in miscommunication and
misunderstanding. A client’s entry into the criminal justice
system and pre-proceeding consultation must be better
acknowledged across the United States.
A. Interpretation is a complex process which requires
specialized knowledge, skill and competence
Interpretation is not simply interpreting from one
language to another and back again. 59 Rather, interpretation
is a complex, rapid process which requires specialized
knowledge, skill, ethics, and competence. 60 There are different
modes of interpreting61 which require distinctly different skill
sets. For example, simultaneous interpretation “involves the
interpreter’s rendering into the foreign language whatever is
being said in English, involving no pauses on the part of the
English speaker.” 62 Consecutive interpretation, which is
frequently used for witness testimony, involves a speaker’s
pausing at regular intervals to allow the interpreter to render
his or her speech into the target language, aloud for everyone
in the courtroom to hear. 63 Thus, the speaker and the
See Frye, supra note 3, at 1402.
See id.
59
Luz M. Molina, Language Access to Louisiana Courts: A Failure to Provide
Fundamental Access to Justice, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 11 (2008).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 12.
62
Id. (citing SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM: COURT
INTERPRETERS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 38 (1990)). “This is the mode used at
the counsel table, whereby the interpreter interprets for the defendant or
litigant what the attorneys, judge, and English-speaking witnesses are saying.”
63
Id. at 12.
57
58
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interpreter take turns and no overlapping speech should be
heard. This mode of interpreting is typically used for foreign
language witness testimony, rendering the testimony in
English for the court, and interpreting the attorney’s and
judge’s questions into the foreign language for the benefit of
the witness.
“Everything rendered in English by the
interpreter is recorded for the court, whereas none of the
foreign language testimony or questions rendered by the
interpreter in the foreign language is recorded by the court
reporter.” 64
Summary interpretation is reserved for technical legal
language and:
involves distilling or condensing what has been said in the
source language not the target language. This mode of
interpreting is to be kept to a minimum in court
interpreting, and is restricted to interpreting highly
technical legal language, language that would be difficult
to follow even for a native speaker of English. 65

In addition to possessing the requisite skill level in the
foreign language, the interpreter must understand and be able
to appropriately interpret formal legal English, standard
English, colloquial English and other sub-cultural varieties. 66
These modes provide a high-level snapshot of the
complexity of interpretation and the level of interpretation
needed at all stages of the criminal justice process to ensure
that the client is understood and that counsel is performing
effectively. It is clear from the complexities raised that
Id.
Molina, supra note 59, at 12-13.
66
Id. at 13 (quoting BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 49, at 19). ‘Formal Legal
Language’ is: ‘the variety of spoken language used in the courtroom that most
closely parallels written legal language; used by the judge in instructing the
jury, passing judgment, and ‘speaking to the record’; used by lawyers when
addressing the court, making motions and requests, etc.; linguistically
characterized by lengthy sentences containing much professional jargon and
employing a complex syntax.’ ‘Standard English’ is the ‘variety of spoken
language typically used in the courtroom by lawyers and most witnesses;
generally labeled CORRECT English and closely paralleling that taught as the
standard in American classrooms; characterized by a somewhat more formal
lexicon than that used in everyday speech.’ ‘Colloquial English’ is a: ‘variety of
language spoken by some witnesses and a few lawyers in lieu of standard
English; closer to everyday, ordinary English in lexicon and syntax; tends to
lack many attributes of formality that characterize standard English; used by a
few lawyers as their particular style or brand of courtroom demeanor.’
‘Subcultural Varieties’ include the ‘language spoken by segments of the society
who differ in speech style and mannerisms from the larger community’.
64
65
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communication for non-English speakers is paramount upon
entry into the criminal justice system, and it should therefore
alert practitioners to a heightened duty under the Sixth
Amendment.
B. The “front-end” of effective assistance of counsel — the
foreign language speaking client’s entry into the
criminal justice system and pre-proceeding
consultation
Language barriers faced by foreign language speakers and
immigrants is intensified in the legal process, particularly
where cases can directly impact a person’s liberty, such as is
the case in habeas claims. 67 State laws generally do not view
the need for interpretation as constitutionally necessary to
meet due process standards, 68 and, therefore, a number of
states have not developed standards for the selection and
At the federal level,
appointment of interpreters. 69
appointment of interpreters for non-English speakers, as well
as specific training and selection, is mandated under 28 U.S.
Code § 1827. However, these measures only apply to judicial
proceedings and do not address entry into the criminal justice
system, including initial consultation with counsel. 70
More broadly, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.4 requires effective and competent communication between
attorney and client, reasonable consultation with the client,
keeping the client reasonably informed, and providing
information to the client and explaining information necessary
to make informed decisions. 71 In terms of communication with
Limited English Proficient clients, the American Bar
Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants has stated, amongst other things, that:
a) [c]lear communication between the practitioner and
client is at the core of effective practice. 72
b) [i]n order for . . . practitioners to meet their professional
responsibilities to provide competent representation to the
client . . . the practitioner either needs to communicate in
the client’s language directly or through a competent
See Molina, supra note 59, at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
69
Id. at 3.
70
28 U.S.C. § 1827.
71
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4. (1983).
72
ABA/SCLAID, supra note 3, at 3.
67
68
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interpreter. This responsibility attaches both to persons
who speak a language other than English and to persons
who rely on American Sign Language (ASL) to
communicate. 73
c) [p]ractitioners should not leave the decision as to the
need for or the securing of an interpreter to their clients’
discretion. 74

While the use of bilingual staff to assist in language
communication may at times be appropriate, informal and
untrained interpreters should not be used and the use of family
and friends as interpreters is discouraged. 75 In any event, it is
not best practice. 76 The provider should:
[A]void the use of informal or untrained interpreters,
including family members and friends of the person being
served. . . Use of family and friends to interpret gives rise
to serious risks that the interpretation will not be neutral
and that the interpreter will not fully understand or be able
to translate the legal options available. Furthermore, there
may be times when the person doing the interpreting will
have an unexpected conflict with the person being served
by the provider. 77

The California guidelines state, amongst other things,
that “adequate communication is necessary in order to render
‘competent’ legal services.” 78 Therefore, it is evident that some
sort of formal qualification in the relevant language is
necessary to be able to adequately interpret for the purposes of
providing legal services. Bilingualism is not sufficient for court
interpreting. 79 It undermines the right to effective assistance
at the consultation and pre-trial stages. Alternatively, in the
event that counsel needs to use informal or untrained
interpreters, it is submitted that there is a duty to properly vet
them in some other way comparable to that of certified
interpreters.
C. The “back-end” of effective assistance of counsel — case
consequences and post-conviction mechanisms for
Id.
Id. (citing Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Opinion 1995–
12, Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, July 6, 1995, page 8).
75
Id. at 25.
76
Molina, supra note 47, at 2.
77
Id.
78
ABA/SCLAID, supra note 3, at 16.
79
Molina, supra note 59, at 11.
73
74
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claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for immigrant
defendants
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are different where
the client is an immigrant and/or foreign language speaker.
The severe consequences of communication breakdown at this
level come to life in such cases. This occurs because in every
guilty plea entered by the non-English speaking defendant, the
trial court should determine whether trial counsel—most often
not Spanish speaking—disclosed every fact material to
accused’s decision to waive jury trial and plead guilty. This
goes beyond a general question posed as to whether the
defendant understands that he is pleading guilty because this
conclusory inquiry does not address counsel’s disclosures and
performance in advising the client on the exercise of his jury
trial right. This is a right personal to the accused which cannot
be exercised by counsel as a matter of his professional
judgment. 80 Unfortunately, Spanish speaking defendants with
allegedly defective pleas have not been able to withdraw their
guilty pleas. 81 Thus ineffective assistance of counsel habeas
petitions are the last resort for these defendants.
Beyond language and language access deficiencies
highlighted above in the cases of Mendoza, Yang and Sanchez,
the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky addressed
ineffective assistance regarding potential immigration
consequences of a guilty plea in circumstances where counsel
failed to provide affirmative and competent legal advice. 82
D. Padilla and the danger of ineffective assistance for
immigrant defendants
The facts in Padilla illustrate the danger of ineffective
assistance for immigrant defendants. Padilla had lived in the
United States as a permanent resident for over 40 years before
pleading guilty to drug-related charges in Kentucky. 83 As a

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
See United States v. Carillo-Guzman, 242 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 2000); (“Given
Carillo-Guzman’s answers to the questions contained in his petition to plead
guilty and posed at the change-of-plea hearing, as well as the availability of a
Spanish interpreter before the hearing and the presence of two interpreters at
the hearing, we are confident Carillo-Guzman understood the proceeding.”); see
United States v. Martinez-Cruz, 186 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1999); see also
United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2014).
82
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
83
Id.at 356.
80
81
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result of his guilty plea, Padilla faced deportation. 84 In postconviction proceedings, Padilla claimed that his counsel failed
to advise him of the deportation consequences before he
entered the guilty plea. 85 Padilla also claimed that counsel told
him that he did not have to worry about immigration status
since he had lived in this country for so long.” 86 The Court held
that it had “little difficulty” concluding that Padilla had
sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally
deficient because counsel had to inform Padilla that his plea
carried a risk of deportation. 87 The decision stands out as a
significant safeguard for immigrant defendants, particularly
because any person with a conviction that had not yet become
final before the decision in Padilla on March 31, 2010 was
automatically and immediately entitled to take advantage of
the court’s holding. 88
Padilla also raised the issue of “how defense counsel is to
determine what immigration consequences are clear or unclear
for purposes of fulfilling their Sixth Amendment advisement
duty.” 89 It has been said that “some immigration consequences
may be unclear due to a lack of established case law, a split in
interpretation by courts, or vagueness that may result from
specialized definitions and terms of art in immigration law.” 90
It can also be noted that some language access consequences
may be unclear for identical reasons. For example, Mendoza
provides narrow relief strictly in the context of equitable
tolling and undeniably only in the Ninth Circuit. The case is
not a Supreme Court authority and has been challenged in
other circuits, illustrated by Yang and Sanchez, creating a split
in interpretation and therefore providing no steady guidance
for future litigants.
E. Broader constitutional concerns
Language access claims and immigration-related claims
Id.
Id. at 359.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 374.
88
Jeffrey L. Fisher & Kendall Turner, The Retroactivity of Padilla After Chaidez
v. United States, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2013, at 43 (explaining that the Court in
Chaidez v. United States held that the decision in Padilla does not generally
apply retroactively).
89
Hans Meyer, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Duty of Defense Counsel Representing
Noncitizen Clients, 40 COLO. LAW. 37, 41 (2011).
90
Id.
84
85
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more broadly raise a number of related constitutional issues.
Among them is the issue that the fates of noncitizen
defendants in immigration-related claims “often depend on
criminal defense counsel, who may well be the only line of
immigration defense for their clients, because indigent
noncitizens are not constitutionally entitled to appointed
The success of
counsel in immigration proceedings.” 91
language access claims raised on habeas or appeal often also
depend on criminal defense counsel though this, too, is
hindered by petitioners having no constitutional right to
counsel in post-conviction proceedings. 92 Meyer writes:
[I]mmigration consequences of a particular offense often
become clear by developing a few critical issues related to
the case. . . immigration status is a critical issue to consider
because immigration law does not subject all noncitizens to
one unified set of consequences. Whether different criminal
grounds of immigration law will apply often depends on a
client’s specific immigration status and when it was
obtained. Thus, understanding an individual client’s
immigration history and status in many cases will serve to
clarify both the immigration consequences that apply and
the duty to advise about them. 93

Similarly, it can be said that language access
consequences often become clear by developing a few critical
issues related to the case. We have started to see this in cases
such as Mendoza. Language access is an even more critical
issue to consider because not all clients will be subject to one
unified set of consequences, unlike codified mandatory
immigration consequences. The extent and relevance of
foreign language access can only be determined on a case-bycase basis.
Thus, understanding an individual client’s
language, language history and language status in many cases
will serve to clarify both the consequences that apply and the
requisite duty counsel must meet in order to appropriately
advise them.
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that counsel understand their duty under
the Sixth Amendment in the context of foreign language access
Id. at 37.
See Sanchez, supra note 7; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 75657 (1991).
93
Meyer, supra note 89, at 41.
91
92
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and advise his or her clients accordingly from day one through
to case completion. This heightened duty also applies to
counsel in later circumstances where habeas claims can be
made and appeals filed, despite there being no constitutional
right to counsel on appeal. The right to counsel does not mean
that a lesser or more relaxed constitutional standard of
effective assistance applies, particularly where foreign
language speakers are concerned.
Language access claims have a significant impact on a
person’s constitutional rights and therefore more must be done
to adequately address the needs of immigrants and foreign
language speaking clients. Lessons learned thus far suggest
that three key procedural mechanisms be considered in pursuit
of fair and impartial access to the justice system. First,
qualified interpreters must be obtained in some capacity at the
pre-proceedings phase. 94 No one can be confident that counsel
has the requisite understanding of a foreign language speaking
client and his or her background if an interpreter is not
engaged from the outset. Second, not only should the habeas
petition form include a question about the petitioner’s native
language, but forms themselves should also be available in
foreign languages (which could be translated for the court) in
order to assist the court in determining the merits and
timeliness of such petitions. Congress should amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 to include such requirements. Third, the court must
establish more streamlined requirements in cases involving a
foreign language speaking party. This does not downplay the
importance of case-by-case analysis, but rather creates a level
of certainty that attorneys can better grasp when advising
foreign language speaking clients. The case law following such
requirements will provide an important first step to better
understanding the relationship between constitutional
requirements as they apply to foreign language speakers and
the criminal justice system going forward. It is a first step that
is long overdue.

94
See Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching out to the Most Insular Minorities: A Proposal
for Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 HARV. C. R.-C. L.
L. REV. 543, 573 (2004).

